University of Miami Law Review
Volume 15

Number 4

Article 12

7-1-1961

Interpleader Actions -- Plaintiff's Attorney's Fees
Edwin C. Ratiner

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr

Recommended Citation
Edwin C. Ratiner, Interpleader Actions -- Plaintiff's Attorney's Fees, 15 U. Miami L. Rev. 437 (1961)
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol15/iss4/12

This Case Noted is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact
library@law.miami.edu.

19611

CASES NOTED

it was indicated that once the particular taxable course of
been chosen, the court would not make the taxability of a
dependent upon an alternative procedure which might not
taxable. 24 What was done, and not what might have been done,
25
the tax liability.

action had
transaction
have been
determined

The interpretation of the Florida court is clearly in line with the
construction of the parent federal statute by the United States Supreme
Court, and with the tendency of all courts to attach tax liability upon a
particular course of action even though non-taxable avenues are open but
unused by the taxpayer.
The case illustrates the high degree of care and foresight required
by today's complex tax statutes. The engaging in transactions without
a full awareness of potential tax consequences may well result in a more
burdensome tax liability than is necessary within the framework of the law.
LEON

A.

CONRAD

INTERPLEADER ACTIONS - PLAINTIFF'S
ATTORNEY'S FEES
In an interpleader action to determine which of two defendantclaimants was entitled to a disputed fund, the chancellor, in his discretion,
awarded attorney's fees to the plaintiff-stakeholder and court costs to
the successful defendant, both to be paid directly by the losing defendant:
On appeal, held, affirmed: an award of costs and fees to be paid directly
by an unsuccessful claimant rather than from the interpleaded fund
was not an abuse of the court's discretion. Lucco v. Treadwell, 127 So.2d
461 (Fla. App. 1961).
While the rule as to the assessment of costs varies between jurisdictions,
in at least a plurality of states,' including Florida, 2 the "disinterested"
stakeholder who brings an interpleader action is entitled to be reimbursed

10,000 shares, simply to provide each holder with more shares of stock, when 100

will serve the same end, is an unnecessary accrual of tax liability. This is particularly
true of nonpublic corporations.
24. Founders General Corp. v. Hoey, 300 U.S. 268 (1937).

25. American Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).

1. While articles and decisions dealing with the precise subject matter of this
note are rather scarce, for an exhaustive -study of the ceneral subject of attorney's fees
in interpleader suits, see Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 190 (1956).

2. See Miller v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 148 Fla. 1, 3 So.2d 519 (1941); Brown vMarsh, 98 Fla. 253, 123 So. 762 (1929).
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for his costs and attorney's fees. 3 As a matter of custom, these costs
and fees are usually paid to the stakeholder directly from the disputed
fund which had been deposited with the registry of the court upon the
initiation of the suit.4 However, it is generally agreed that, as between
claimants, the costs incurred by the successful claimant and by the
stakeholder should be taxed eventually against the losing claimant who,
by his invalid claim, made the interpleader action necessary. 5 Thus, the
costs awarded the stakeholder out of the fund are eventually paid back to
the fund by the losing claimant.
The rationale for paying the stakeholder's litigation expenses directly
out of the fund appears to be that since these costs may prove difficult
to recover from a losing claimant, it would be unfair to place the burden
of collection upon the innocent, disinterested stakeholder.0

3. 48 C.J.S. Interpleader § 50(b) (1947). While the instant case did not concern
itself with the necessary conditions precedent to the stakeholder's recovery of attorney's
fees, it is interesting to note Florida's unique position on the matter.
In Brown v. Marsh, 98 Fla. 253, 123 So. 762 (1929), plaintiff contracted
with X to build plaintiff's house. X partially performed, then quit after receiving part
payment. Plaintiff completed the house. Materialmen of X started suit against plaintiff
who, as a stakeholder of a fund (balance of total amount due X under the contract
less amounts paid to X less cost to plaintiff of completing the house), interpleaded
the materialmen to determine the priority of their rights to the fund.
The Florida Supreme Court cited the general rule that a stakeholder with a
substantial, although not direct, interest in the result of the litigation cannot recover
his solicitor's fees from the fund. However, the court went on to say that since the
decree of interpleader was sought by complainant for his own protection, the costs should
be borne by him.
In Drummond Title Co. v. Weinroth, 77 So.2d 606 (Fla. 1955), the title company,
as escrow agent for the parties to a contract, delayed interpleader until after suit was
commenced against it by a claimant. The chancellor decreed the stakeholder could not
recover his attorney's fees.
In affirming the decree, the Florida Supreme Court, quoting from Brown v. Marsh,
98 Fla. 253, 123 So. 762 (1929), (wherein the stakeholder also waited until he was
sued before interpleading) said: '[Tjhe interpleader [is] sought by the complainant for
his own protection." Drummond Title Co. v. Weinroth, supra at 610.
From these cases, it appears that Florida follows the rather unique view that the
fact that the suit was commenced by a claimant against the stakeholder, while permitting
the stakeholder to interplead the claimants by answer, gives the stakeholder sufficient
"interest" in the outcome of the litigation to preclude his recovery of attorney's fees.
An analysis of the cases in Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 190 (1956) shows that in
all other cases in which the same question arose, the fact that the stakeholder did not
originate the suit, but that it was started by a claimant, does not preclude the recovery
of attorney's fees by the stakeholder.
Furthermore, it can well be said that eiry stakeholder is "interested" in the
outcome of an interpleader suit, since the very purpose of it is to benefit the stakeholder
primarily. In State v. Mauritz-Wells Co., 170 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943), tile
court stated that the distribution of the fund is a mere incident to the primary purpose
of protecting the stakeholder against double liability.
In essence, the recovery of attorney's fees by the Florida stakeholder seems to be
predicated, among other things, on the stakeholder's ability to outrun the claimants
to the courthouse.
4. Shrepic v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 120 F. Supp. 650 (W.D. Pa. 1954);
48 C.J.S. Interpleader § 50(d) (1947).
5. Globe Indem. Co. v. Puget Sound Co.. 154 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1946); Brown
v. Marsh, 98 Fla. 253, 123 So. 762 (1929); 30 AM. JUR. Interpleader § 28 (1958).
6. Shrepic v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 120 F. Supp. 650 (W.D. Pa. 1954).
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In the instant case,7 one of two defendant-claimants had deposited
five hundred dollars ($500.00) with the plaintiff as an escrow agent
pursuant to a proposed sale between the defendants. Failing to reach
an agreement on the sale, both defendants claimed the escrowed fund.
The plaintiff thereupon filed an interpleader suit, requiring both claimants
to prove their claims. A decree pro confesso was rendered against one
claimant. Among other things, this decree held that the losing claimant
was to pay to the plaintiff-stakeholder the sum of one hundred fifty
dollars ($150.00) as a reasonable attorney's fee. In addition, the losing
claimant was to pay to the successful claimant the court costs of nineteen
dollars and ten cents ($19.10) which had been previously deducted from
the disputed fund. The losing claimant appealed on the ground that the
costs should have been assessed against the fund itself. The appellate
court, noting the unfairness of placing the burden on the stakeholder
of collecting his costs from the losing claimant, acknowledged the customary
procedure of paying attorney's fees directly out of the fund itself.8 On
the other hand, the court stated that taxation of the costs against the
fund itself would be tantamount to taxing the successful claimant, thereby
imposing upon him the burden of collecting from the losing claimant. 9
Finding that the losing claimant would, in any event, be ultimately liable
for all costs, the appellate court held the decree of the chancellor to be
a proper use of discretion.
While the decision will not alter the ultimate liability of a losing
claimant, it may adversely affect the stakeholder who, instead of receiving
cash in hand from the fund, receives an award which may prove difficult
to collect. This decision effectively shifts the burden of collection from
the winning defendant to the stakeholder. Perhaps a more equitable result
could be obtained by advancing attorney's fees to the stakeholder directly
from the fund, and by decreeing the losing defendant liable to his successful
opponent for costs and the stakeholder's attorney's fees as well. This
procedure would preserve the customary favoritism justly due the disinterested stakeholder, who, as a mere depositary, deserves this consideration.
EDWIN

7. Lucco v. Treadwell, 127 So.2d 461 (Fla. App. 1961).
8. Id. at 463.
9.Ibid.
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